The present English law on escape, prison breach and rescue is unnecessarily complicated and subject to the remants of history, when the death penalty (as well as drawing, hanging and quartering in the case of treason) could still beimposed. This area of the law should be modernised, in order to reflect the twenty-first century.
 In the Assizes of Clarendon in 1166, Henry II (1154-89) ordered sheriffs to have prisons built in each county where they did not previously exist in order to hold those accused of felonies until they could be tried by justices in eyre. 29 Many towns were also ordered by the sovereign to maintain prisons;
 Some prisons were subject to a franchise from the Crown. 30 That is, the sovereign sold the right to arrest, and hold, a free man. The income of the franchisee derived from the difference between the cost of maintaining the prison and the money reserved for the upkeep of the prisoner. As a result, prisoners often bore much of the cost of their upkeep. 31 Over time-with the exception of the palatinates-a doctrine prevailed that all prisons were those of the sovereign, this being an aspect of his administration of justice. 32 Pugh asserted the phrase prisona regis was being applied by the Chancery in the earlier years of Henry III (1216-72). 33 He also thought that a legal doctrine emerged that a prison-to be lawful-required express sanction from the Crown. 34 As it was, in medieval times-save for the main London prisons-most prisons were small, and not very secure, affairs. Indeed, until the 18 th century-and major prison reforms commencing from the 1790's-local prisons were a pale shadow of our modern prisons which are difficult to escape (or rescue) persons from. McGowen states, as to prisons in the 18 th century:
There were an extraordinary number of places of confinement, probably more than three hundred. The possession of such an establishment was a jealously guarded privilege for a borough, manorial, or ecclesiastical franchise holder. Yet many of these local jails consisted of no more than a gatehouse, room, or cellar. They seldom contained inhabitants for any length of time. Only a few establishments held a significant number of prisoners. The prison population of the county jail at Warwick, for instance, fluctuated considerably depending on whether it was near time for assizes….John Howard, the prisoner reformer, 35 found 33 felons in the jail [at Warwick] in January 1776, along with 24 debtors, whereas in October he discovered only 7 felons and 22 debtors. London contained the largest prisons and a disproportionate share of the prison population. The most important London prison, Newgate, often held as many as 300 felons in the late eighteenth century. The city also possessed large separate establishments for debtors such as the Fleet and the Marshalsea. 36 Since prisons were not well built, it was not too difficult to escape-or rescue a person-from them. That said:
 Debtors-who made up at least half the prison population in the 18 th century 37 -tended not to escape, for lack of incentive; 38 28 Ibid, p 4, notes that, in 1155-6, the sheriffs of London and Middlesex claimed allowances for repairing the Fleet and that, in 1157-8, the sheriff of Hampshire paid the wages of the king's jailer at Winchester. 29 Ibid. See also ch 4 (county gaols). Ibid, p 59 'The sheriffs had been told in 1166 that they must cite their gaols in one of the king's boroughs or castles.' A translation of the relevant wording in the Assize of Clarendon is: 'And in the several counties where there are no jails, let them be made in a borough or in some castle of the king…to the end that the sheriffs may keep in them those who have been arrested by the officers whose function it is to do this and by their servants.' See also Bellamy, n 11, p 167. Also, F Pollock & FW Maitland, The History of English Law (Cambridge UP, 2 nd ed, 1984 rep), pp 516-7 re the development of prisons and how the threat of imprisonment was utilised as a means of securing a fine. At p 517 'Now, so far as we can see, the justices of Henry III's reign used their power of imprisonment chiefly as a means of inflicting pecuniary penalties. The wrong doer but rarely goes to prison even for a moment.' See also Harding, n 11, ch 1. 30 See generally, Pugh, n 11, ch 5. Ibid, p 87 'By the late thirteenth century, if not before, the word 'prison' (prisona) had acquired a very extensive meaning. It could be applied to a county gaol maintained by a sheriff…to one of the few 'national' prisons, or to a franchise gaol owned by the lord of a liberty. The third of these classes is naturally a very broad one, for it comprises prisons owned by leading ecclesiastics and lay barons and also those in borough ownership.' See also Harding, n 11, ch 1. 31 See generally, Morris, n 11, ch 1 and Pugh, n 11, chs 7 & 8. 32 Pugh, n 11, p 87 'According to the doctrine that eventually prevailed, all prisons, or at any rate all prisons outside the palatinates, were the king's. They were his because they were ancillary to his justice.' Coke, n 13, vol 2, p 589 'Albeit divers lords of liberties have custody of the prisons, and some in fee, yet the prison itself is the king's pro bono publico…for no subject can have the prison itself, but the king only….' (spelling modernised). 33 Ibid, p 87. Ibid, p 93 'Increasingly from Henry III's middle years justices were appointed to deliver franchise prisons in common with the gaols of counties and the prisons of urban communities. This policy prevented the franchise-holder from setting up a private criminal jurisdiction and thus making his prison a base from which to terrorise his neighbours.' Ibid, p 95 'After the end of the thirteenth century…Justices began to travel on well-defined circuits and in their peregrinations delivered not only county and municipal gaols but also the prisons of the lords of liberties.' 34 Ibid, p 95. 35  Those who did, however, were felons and, more rarely, traitors-in order to avoid the death penalty. Thus, it is somewhat inevitable that the cases (and texts) on escape and rescue-as well as the punishment of jailers for letting prisoners escape-tend to be concerned with these instances.
The relative ease in which it was possible to escape from prison applies all the more to the small rooms or lockups utilised by villages, towns and boroughs by their constables and headboroughs (also called tithingmen).
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Concept of 'Escape' In Early Times
Pugh stated that:
In the middle ages the word 'escape' covered a multitude of different activities. It might be used where a prisoner broke out of prison or where he simply walked out. It might signify that a sheriff, gaoler, or other officer had corruptly allowed a prisoner to purchase his release, or that a prisoner who was being escorted to prison by a tithing, township, or village constable eluded the vigilance of the escort.
Eventually it could even be used where a man arrested at the suit of a party was subjected to a form of detention too mild to achieve the coercive aims of his antagonist-at-law. These various forms of 'escaping', if proved against the prisoner or his keeper, usually brought punishment to one or other or to both. To fix the blame and to settle the punishment occupied much time and thought and resulted in the end in the erection of a gigantic mound of legal learning. 40 Pugh also notes that references to escape can be traced back as early as the Pipe Roll of 1130. 41 He cites some examples. In 1229-31, no less than 31 thieves escaped from Winchester prison. 42 And, in 1275, 19 persons broke out of Newgate prison. 43 Further, there were rescues-such as in 1268 when armed men broke into the bishop of Lincoln's prison to rescue a man. 44 
In conclusion, early on, 'escape' involved not only a prisoner escaping from a prison. It included where a person freed himself from the arrest of a constable (headborough etc.) or from his lock-up (police station). Also, where a prisoner became free as a result of the wilful assistance-or negligence-of his jailer or a constable.
Punishment Prior to 1295
In early times it is likely that escaped prisoners often suffered immediate 'rough' justice and, therefore, a case never came before a court in respect of their escaping. 45 Also, it seems clear that-prior to 1295-the common law provided that 'breaking prison' (that is, escaping using force) was a felony. Thus, Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England written c.1240, stated:
When they have been confined to prison because of the nature of their crime, they conspire to break their chains and break prison and escape, they are to be punished more severely than the reason for their consignment to prison demands, that is by the supreme penalty [i.e. death], even if they are found innocent of the crime for which they were imprisoned. 46 more professional (often, they comprised ex-military personnel paid for by the county, as opposed to jailers operating pursuant to a franchise who were paid pursuant to fees exacted from prisoners). See also Bellamy, n 11, pp 177, 178. 39 Halsbury, Statutes of England, vol 33(2), preliminary note to the Act, notes that the earliest form of police organization seemed to have been a local association of persons who -as the king's subjects-became sureties for one another's keeping the peace. These associations elected principal men called headboroughs, borsholders or tithingmen who were responsible for maintaining order in the association. DM Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford, 1980) (definition of headborough). 'The chief of the 10 men who comprised a frankpledge (qv), elected by the court leet with the responsibility for the keeping of order in the area for which he was elected. They were gradually replaced by petty and parish constables.' See also Halsbury, n 18, vol 36(1), para 101. Hale, n 4, vol 2, p 96 noted that the authority of the tithingmen, headboroughs and borsholders were much the same as that of the contstable (none of the former positions now exist). See also Penal Reform in England (Macmillan & Co, 1946) , ch 4 (the English police system). 40 Pugh, n 11, p 218. He cites, Hale, n 4. 41 Ibid. Cf. The escape of Flambard in 1100, n 24. 42 Ibid, p 219. See also Harding, n 11, p 22. 43 Ibid, p 220. 44 Ibid, p 222. See also rescues from the Tower of London in 1312 and 1325. Ibid, pp 222-3. 45 Pugh, n 11, p 227 mentions escaped prisoners being beheaded on the spot in 1293, 1315 and 1324. Bellamy, n 11, p 178 'Until the middle of the fourteenth century a prisoner who was originally suspect of felony might, on recapture, be executed without proper trial.' See also JW Jeudwine, Tort Crime and Police Law (London, 1917) This was draconian and it seems to have applied regardless of whether a person was in prison on account of a crime or a civil matter. 47 Also, whenever a person was in lawful custody-whether that was in prison or not.
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One suspects the (eventual) source of this was Roman law since Callistratus, a Roman jurist, in book 6 his Judicial Examinations, declared:
Of those who, after being lodged in prison, conspire to smash their fetters and break out of jail, punishment is to be imposed over and beyond that due for the offence for which they were lodged as accused; and even though they be found innocent of the charge for which they were flung in jail, yet they should [still] be punished: but those who expressed their conspiracy should receive a lighter penalty.
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Britton, writing c. 1290, re-iterated the punishment of death for prison breach:
We will that a prison be accounted a place limited by us within certain bounds for the keeping of the bodies of men, which bounds we forbid on pain of death any one to pass with a felonious intent of escaping; and if any one having such intent is taken, and is attainted of compassing that felonious intent, let him receive judgment of death. 50 However, Britton asserted that it was not a felony for a prisoner to escape from a franchise prison. 51 This appears to also be the opinion of the author of The Mirror of Justices (c.1290).
52 And, if a prisoner escaped by being let out by his jailer-either voluntarily or by negligence-it seems the prisoner was not held responsible and, thus, was not punished as a felon. He had 'gone out' not 'broken out'. 53 As to the jailer:
 In the case of breaking out, Britton stated that the jailer should be fined 100s. 54 However, if the jailer was found guilty of having consented to the breaking out (i.e. it was voluntary), the punishment was death. 55 That said, Pugh noted there seemed to be few instances where the same was inflicted with all its rigour. 56 Rather, in the early 12 th century, at least, the jailer usually incurred a heavy fine. Sometimes, he also lost his office, was imprisoned or outlawed. 48 Hawkins, n 4, vol 2, p 123 'And first as to prison breaches, as they stood by the common law; it seems the better opinion, that all such offences were felonies, if the party were lawfully in prison for any cause whatsoever, whether criminal or civil, and whether he were actually in the walls of a prison, or only in the stocks, or in the custody of any person who had lawfully arrested him; and it seems not to have been any way material whether the prison did belong to the king, or to the lord of a franchise…' Hawkins may be incorrect in this in respect of franchise prisons (private prisons), see ns 51 & 52 re Britton and the Mirror. 49 See A Watson, Digest of Justinian (trans. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), vol 4, 48.3.13. Bracton's formulation is close to this, suggesting he may have had regard to this passage. 50 Britton (ed FM Nichols, John Byrne, 1901), p 37. Fleta (c.1290), Selden Society, vol 72, p 68 who makes it even more draconian 'If a charge of escape of thieves and prison-breaking is brought, not only will the prison-breakers and they who removed their fetters be held liable, but all others found in the goal, even though they are blameless of any fault, except there by any [among them] who discovered the conspiracy of the prison-breakers and cried out or otherwise hindered [the escape] to the best of his ability.' Pugh, n 11, p 228 'all the evidence contributes to the view that throughout the greater part of the thirteenth century prison-breaking was a felony in itself, and by Westminster (1275) [ie. the Statute of Westminster the First 1275, c 13] it was numbered among irrepleviable offences.' 51 Ibid 'to escape from the prison of another is no felony.' See also Pugh, n 11, p 93, 230. 52 Mirror, n 47, p 52 'Every common prison is a gaol, and only the king has the keeping of it. Every other man's prison is private, and from this anyone may escape who can, provided he do not other trespass in his escape.' 53 Pugh, n 11, p 230 'If the door stood open through the negligence of the gaoler or was forced open by the activities of other prisoners or a mob without, the prisoner himself was exonerated. He had 'gone out' not 'broken out', and any culpability was transferred from him to his rescuers or keepers.' See also the statement of Coke in the text to n 58. 54 Britton, n 50, p 37. Also 'If the prisoner was in the custody of any one claiming the wardenship in fee, let the franchise be seized into our hands…If any prisoner escape from the custody of a township, let the township be in our mercy in the eyre of the justices, according to the custom of the country; and if from the custody of a private person, let such person be amerced…'. See also the Mirror, n 47, p 151 (amercements re escape). 55 Ibid, 'If any gaoler be suspected of having consented to the escape, let him be taken and indicted for consenting to the felony; and if he be found guilty of consenting, let him have judgment of death.' 56 Pugh, n 11, p 234. 57 
Punishment after 1295
The punishment of death for a prisoner who may have been incarcerated only for a minor criminal, or a civil, offence was unduly harsh. Coke's reference to Huse CJ is to a case before the Exchequer Chamber in 1468. 68 A convicted felon, while being taken to the gallows, was rescued from the sheriff's custody by others using force, and taken to sanctuary. It was held this was a felony in the rescuers. Also, that all were liable as principals. In this decision, Huse CJKB recalled a case when he was Attorney-General where the justices said that a rescue from prison was a felony at common law, but that a rescue from the person of the under-sheriff or sheriff was not a felony until the statute of 58 Coke, n 13, vol 2, p 588. 59 Ibid, p 589. 60 Ibid, p 590. 61 Ibid, p 591 'if the warrant be not lawful, if the gaoler suffer such a prisoner to escape voluntarily, it is no felony in him.' 62 In other words, the law recognised early on that prison escape was more serious than the escape from the custody of a sheriff, constable or private person. 63 Russell (writing in 1964) , n 4, p 330 'breach of prison, or even conspiracy to break it, is felony at common law, for whatever cause, criminal or civil, the party was lawfully imprisoned; and whether he was actually within the walls of the prison or only in the stocks, or in the custody of any person who had lawfully arrested him.' Dalton, n 13 (writing in 1619) 'Breaking of prison (before the statute De Frangentibus Prisonam, made 1 Edw 2) was felony by the common law, for what cause soever he were in prison, yea though hee had beene imprisoned but for a trespasse.' 64 It was repealed by the Statute Law Reform Act 1948. 65 23 Edw 1. 66 This statute was analysed in detail in Coke, n 13, vol 2, pp 588-92. Pugh, n 11, p 228 'a statute of 1295, which declared that none should have judgment of life or members merely for the offence of breaking prison…Such punishment was only to be inflicted if it was the one appropriate to the offence with which the prisoner had been charged. ' 72 Hale also thought that prison breach was negligent escape on the part of the jailer since the jail should have been sufficiently secure to prevent this. 73 Further, it seems that jailers were often pardoned (which pardon they usually purchased) in the case where they did not actively connive at the escape (that is, it was not a voluntary escape); 74  As to a voluntary escape, Coke (published 1641) said that there was no felony in the jailer unless the prisoner was under custody by lawful warrant expressing the offence and there must be a felony at the time of the escape. 75 That said, one suspects that-even in this case-jailers were not often executed. If they were, who would want to risk his life in the uncertain area of a judge determining whether a prisoner had escaped by reason of the jailer's negligence or wilfulness? Thus, the law on this, for jailers, was really in terrorem.
Finally, in Elizabethan times, escape from arrest could result in additional penalties, by virtue of proclamation.
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In conclusion, after 1295 
Punishment in The Case of High Treason
An exception was made in the case of high treason. Here the punishment was particularly gruesome-drawing, hanging and quartering. 78 Thus, it is not unexpected that a prisoner would seek to break out of prison, whether before his trial or-more especially-after he knew the verdict. 69 This case may have been 1473.004 = Pasch. 13 Edw 4, pl 4, fo 8b-9a. See also Select Cases in the Exchequer Chamber, SS, vol 64, p 34, case 13 (note on the status of the escaped prisoner). Billing was Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1469-81. Choke was justice of the Common Pleas from 1461-83. 70 Hale, n 4, p 606 'Rescue of a person imprisoned for felony is also felony by the common law.' Hale noted that the person must have been in custody for felony (or suspicion of felony) or under arrest for felony. Ibid. 71 See 19 Hen VII c 10 (1503-4)(of Voluntary and Negligent Escapes, also called the Statute of Escapes). Pugh, n 11, p 237 'The effect of the statute seems to be to blur the distinction between 'voluntary' and 'negligent' escapes, with both of which, according to its title, it purports to deal, and to treat most escapes as 'negligent'. In the interests of ensuring that escapes if proved do not go unpunished altogether, it relaxes the serious consequences of corrupt participation on the keeper's part.' Sometimes, Parliament specified a determined fine (often very high) if a jailer were to let an important prisoner escape. Ibid, pp 240-1. For the responsibility of the jailer for an escaped debtor's debt, see Pugh, n 11, pp 242-4. 72 Hale, n 4, p 600. 73 Ibid, p 601. This also explains (perhaps) why judges in earlier times had no problem with prisoners (especially those charged with treason) being loaded with irons, in order to forestall escape. It was to protect the jailers. . See also Bellamy, n 11, p 194 (purchase of pardons). 75 Coke, n 13, vol 3, p 69 'There must be a felony done at the time of the escape: for a relation which is but a fiction of law, shall never make a man a felon, as likewise there it appeareth.' Coke refers to Staunford, n 12, book 1, cap 26 (voluntary escape). See also Coke, n 13, vol 2, p 590. 76 For example, proclamation of 21 March 1565 of Elizabeth I (1588-1602) providing Penalties for Resisting Arrest (persons required to obey and yield themselves to the arrests and attachments of all mayors, sheriffs, bailiffs, sergeants, and other ministers 'without refusal, rescues, or resistance' on pain of being committed to prison and to be severely chastised and punished for the contempt, on top of the punishment for the offence). See Hughes, n 74, vol 2, pp 260-1. Also, vol 3, pp 82-3 (proclamation prohibiting unlawful assembly under martial law of 20 June 1591) & p 143 (Ibid, Prior to this Act of 1423 there had been a famous case of prison breach in 1413 81 -albeit, Oldcastle was not condemned for such, nor for treason but for heresy (the original charge). As to what led to the Act of 1423, the position is not clear whether it was the result of the circumstances relating to Thomas Exeter (Excestre) 82 and/or Sir John Mortimer. Probably, the latter, in particular, influenced the Act of 1423. 83 The preamble to this Act also making it clear that its purpose was to clarify an otherwise uncertain position.
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 In 1421, Exeter-who it is said was committed to prison on suspicion of treason 85 -escaped from prison prior to trial. 86 Re-taken on a charge of theft, he was indicted not for this but for prison breach. Found guilty he suffered, in 1423, the same punishment as for treason.
87 I have said 'it is said' since the commentary to the note in the Selden Society reports indicates this. However, the note itself suggests that Exeter was actually in prison for a felony 88 (as did Dyer, in his notebook in 1555). See, pp xxvii, 69-76. Cf. p 69 the note suggests that Excestre was outlawed for felony and was not in prison for treason, see n n 88. 86 In 1422, knives, files and hatchets were smuggled into the prison (the Marshalsea) which Exeter and other prisoners used to break their bonds and escape. 87 Pugh, n 11, p 229. See also Seipp, n 68, 1422.056ss (referring 1 Hen VI pl 22 fo 5b). It says that Excestre was drawn and hanged (fuit traine et auxy pendu). Pulton (writing in 1609) thought this was petty treason, see n 12, pp 111 'It is petit treason if a man outlawed of felony, and imprisoned in the k[ing's] bench, be attainted for breaking of prison, and letting at liberty such persons as were there imprisoned for treason.'(spelling modernised). Also, p 148 'If a man imprisoned for felony, doth break the prison, and let escape a prisoner that is in prison for treason, this is petit treason in him that did break the prison.' See also Fitzherbert (in 1584), n 12, p 30. 88 See SS, n 85, p 69. It says 'A man was outlawed for felony and was imprisoned in the king's bench. And he was indicted in the king's bench [on an indictment] that he broke the prison, and knowing [sachaunt] that certain persons were prisoners in the same prison for treason, he led them out. And for this he was arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty: and he was found guilty: and he was adjudged by all the justices a traitor, and he was drawn and hanged etc. Note this.' Also 'A man outlawed for felony is imprisoned in the king's bench [on a charge] that he had broken the prison, knowing that prisoners were in it. And it is adjudged treason by all the justices there. And he was drawn and hanged.' 89 Dyer in Dyer's Reports, SS, n 85, vol 110, p 406 refers to a felony. He noted (1555) 'One Bennet was attainted of high treason, for counterfeiting coin, and was wilfully allowed to escape by the gaoler. The gaoler is índicted for this as a traitor. Should the indictment say 'knowing Bennet to be attainted…' as in 1 Hen VI? (there someone was outlawed for felony and imprisoned in the king's bench broke the prison, knowing the prisoners to be there for treason, and brought them out, and this was adjudged treason [ 92 Thus, this seems to be an example of it being treason to commit prison breach when committed to prison on suspicion of treason, in accordance with the 1423 Act.
In the case of Mortimer, it may be suspected that he was tried by Parliament after the Act was passed so that he could prosecuted under it. 93 The gravamen of the 1423 Act provided that persons committed for treason, who escaped, were to be considered as convicted. Hawkins) . 97 Blackstone considered the position from the civil-and then the criminal-sphere, which helped clarify matters. Thus, in the civil sphere, when considering the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum -a form 90 This clearly seems to be the view of Hawkins, n 4, p 127 'a person committed for high treason becomes guilty of felony only, and not of high treason, by breaking the prison and escaping singly, without letting out any other prisoner; for that no offence is to be construed high treason, which is not either within the purview of [the Treason Act 1351, still extant] or of some subsequent statute relating to treason; but if other persons committed also for high treason escape together with him, and his intention in breaking the prison were to favour their escape as well as his own, he seems to be guilty of high treason in respect of their escape, for that there are no accessories in high treason; and such assistance given to persons committed for felony, will make him who gives it an accessory to the felony, and by the same reason a principal in the case of high treason.' See also p 140. Also, Pugh, n 11, p 231. Pugh says that the man who helped Exeter escape was executed as a traitor (see also n 81). However, this is not stated in YB 1 Hen VI, SS, n 85 vol 50, pp xxvi-ii. 91 The treason seems to have been to aspire to the throne as heir of the Earl of March, see B Wolffe, Henry VI (Eyre Methuen, 1981), pp 34-5. Also, Bellamy, n 83, p 130. See also YB 1 Hen VI, SS, n 85, vol 50, pp xxv-vi. Mortimer escaped from the Tower in 1422 in the company of Thomas Payne (Payn), secretary to Sir John Oldcastle. He was re-taken to the Tower before November1423. It is not wholly clear whether the Act of 1423 was passed with reference to his escape-to clarify that it was treason to escape when held for treason. However, it may be Mortimer was tried for treason prior to the Act and then escaped after it, such that its terms applied. See, p xxvi. See also Bellamy, n 83, pp 130, 195 95 The 1414 execution of a jailer for voluntary escape mentioned by Bellamy (see n 83) seems good authority for this. Hale, n 4, p 590 'A voluntary escape is when any person having a felon lawfully in his custody voluntarily permits him to escape from it or to go at large, and this is…treason in case the person be imprisoned for treason.' Cf. p 596 'If the prisoner be rescued, or rescue himself [ie. escape or commit prison breach] against the will of him, that hath him in custody, this is no voluntary escape, nor is the gaoler etc punishable for the same.' 96 In part, this was helped by the fact that there were few franchise prisons left. For the position mid-17th century and indictments, see W Stubbs & G Talmash, The Crown Circuit Companion (printed for H Lintot, 1749), pp 220-3 (indictments for a constable negligently permitting escape re a felony and a misdemeanor, also against a jailer for permitting a prisoner to escape). 97 In the case of Hale, n 4, his text was published in 1736. However, being written in the 1640's (and not corrected by him) it is of less accuracy than that of Hawkins. The best editions for Hawkins generally are those of 1739 (3rd ed) and 1824 (last ed).
www 2014 of execution against the body of the debtor until satisfaction was made for the debt, costs and damages 98 -he stated:
Escapes are either voluntary, or negligent. Voluntary are such as are by the express consent of the keeper, after which he can never re-take his prisoner again (though the plaintiff may re-take him at any time) but the sheriff must answer for the debt. Negligent escapes are where the prisoner escapes without his keeper's knowledge or consent; and then upon fresh pursuit the defendant may re-taken, and the sheriff shall be excused, if he has him again before any action brought against himself for the escape. A rescue of a prisoner in execution, either going to gaol or in gaol, or a breach of prison, will not excuse the sheriff from being guilty of and answering for the escape; for he ought to have sufficient force to keep him, seeing he may command the power of the county [ie. the posse comitatus]. 99 In the criminal sphere, Blackstone (writing in 1769) stated as to escape:
An escape of a person arrested upon criminal process, by eluding the vigilance of his keepers before he is put in hold, is also an offence against public justice, and the party himself is punishable by fine or imprisonment. 100 But the officer permitting such escape, either by negligence or connivance, is much more culpable than the prisoner; the natural desire of liberty pleading strongly in his behalf, though he ought in strictness of law to submit himself quietly to custody, till cleared by the due course of justice. Officers therefore, who, after arrest, negligently permit a felon to escape, are also punished by fine; 101 but voluntary escapes, by consent and connivance of the officer, are a much more serious offence: for it is generally agreed that such escapes amount to the same kind of offence, and are punishable in the same degree, as the offence for which the prisoner is guilty, and for which he is in custody, whether treason, felony or trespass. And this, whether he were actually committed to gaol, or only under bare arrest. 102 But the officer cannot be thus punished, till the original delinquent is actually found guilty or convicted, by verdict, confession, or outlawry, of the crime for which he was so committed or arrested: otherwise it might happen, that the officer might be punished for treason or felony, and the person arrested and escaping might turn out to be an innocent man. But, before the conviction of the principal party, the officer thus neglecting his duty may be fined and imprisoned for a misdemeanour.
103 (wording divided for ease of reference).
As to breach of prison, Blackstone states:
Breach of prison by the offender himself, when committed for any cause, was felony at the common law: or even conspiring to break it. But this severity was mitigated by the statute de frangentibus prisonam, 1 Edw II [ see 5] which enacts, that no person shall have judgment of life or member, for breaking prison, unless committed for some capital offence. So that to break prison, when lawfully committed for any treason or felony, remains still felony as at the common law; and to break prison, when lawfully confined upon any other inferior charge, is still punishable as a high misdemeanour by fine and imprisonment. For the statute, which ordains that such offence shall be no longer capital, never meant to exempt it entirely from every degree of punishment. 104 As to rescue, Blackstone states:
Rescue is the forcibly freeing another from an arrest or imprisonment; and is always the same offence in the stranger so rescuing, as it would have been in the party himself to have broken prison. 105 A rescue therefore of one apprehended for felony, is felony; for treason, treason; and for a misdemeanour, a misdemeanour also. But here, as upon voluntary escapes, the principal must first be attainted before the rescuer can be punished: and for the same reason; because perhaps in fact it may turn out that there has been no offence committed. 106 In the first edition of his work in 1822, Archbold summarised the position, with specimen forms of indictment:
 Negligent Escape. If a person escaped due to the negligence of the constable, the punishment of the constable was a fine. If the negligence was that of a private person, the punishment was a fine or imprisonment, or both (the punishment was nothing, if the imprisonment of the escapee was not for a criminal matter);  Escape from a Constable. To escape from the custody of a constable, the punishment of the escapee was a fine and imprisonment;  Jailer -Voluntary Escape. A jailer permitting a voluntary escape was punishable to the same extent as the offence for which the prisoner was found guilty (whether treason, felony or trespass). This was determined after the prisoner was convicted (if at all). Until then, it was fine and imprisonment 
Major Changes in Modern Times
Prior to considering the modern legal position-as enunciated by Archbold (see 9-11)-the major changes that have occurred in this area of law since 1822 should be noted-not least to show why it is not especially advisable to rely on the former historical position. These changes are as follows:
 Private Prisons. In early times there were many private prisons-criminal and ecclesiastical. Legal writers had to take these into account-as well as the fact that the jailers would likely be of little competence and reluctant to put their own lives at risk, to prevent prisoners escaping. 108 Thus, Archbold noted that, if the rescuers were convicted of felony, the court (at its discretion) could adjudge them to be transported for 7 years or to be imprisoned or imprisoned with hard labour for 1-3 years (1 & 2 Geo 4 (1821) c. 88, s 1). Rescuing persons in custody against the Black Act was felony with death (25 Geo 2, c 37, s 9). Assaulting or beating a constable, to obstruct, resist or prevent the apprehension of a person for felony (besides the ordinary punishment for misdemeanours) was punishable with imprisonment with hard labour for 6 months to2 years (1 & 2 Geo 4 (1821) c 88, s 2). 109 Conveying files to a prisoner to enable him to escape was felony with transportation for 7 years if the prisoner was at the time convicted of treason or felony (or committed for treason or felony expressed in the warrant). It was a misdemeanour with fine and imprisonment if convicted or committed for any other offence or for a debt, damages, or costs in a civil case amounting to £100 (16 Geo 2 (1742) c 31, s 2). Aiding and assisting a prisoner to attempt to escape from gaol-though no escape was actually made-was punishable in the same manner (Ibid, s 1) . Aiding or assisting a prisoner in custody for treason or felony (petty larceny excepted) to make his escape from the constable or officer conveying him under a warrant to prison or from a person conveying him to a ship for transportation, was a felony with transportation for 7 years (16 Geo 2 (1742) c 31, s 3). 110 Hawkins, n 4, book 2, p 124. See also Harding, n 11, ch 1. 111 Ibid. This on the basis that 'imprisonment is nothing else but a restraint of liberty.' 25 Edw III stat 2 c ii (1351) decreed that stocks were to be built in every town. The stocks fell into disuse in the early 19 th century. See Walker, n 39 (stocks) and Du Cane, n 11, p 14 (last use after 1860). As to the pillory, this was abolished in 1837. Ibid. 114 The principle of benefit of clergy was abolished in 1827. See Walker, n 39 (benefit of clergy) and Hawkins, n 4, book 2, p 130 (benefit of clergy). 115 Walker, n 39 (appeal of felony) 'In the case of death by murder or manslaughter the feudal lord of the deceased, the widow, or the heir male might bring an appeal, in substance an accusation or challenge or claim for loss to himself rather than for harm to the public'. (such as the sheriff) . 125 The cases and legal commentators often refer to negligent jailers being fined-which would seem to be correct where they were paying a fine in lieu of their being imprisoned for their default. 126 As Bellamy and Pollock and Maitland point out, it was not a case of imprisonment and a fine, the fine was paid to avoid imprisonment or to reduce the time a person was condemned to spend there. 127 Thus, fines were an important part of revenue raising for the sovereign-especially when there were few prisons. Today, the position is quite different and fines as a revenue raising alternative to imprisonment should be irrelevant in this context. It is asserted, therefore, that fines, should be abolished in the context of escape, rescue and prison breach-all of which should merit a prison sentence (not least, to deter rescuers and officers who permit voluntary escapes).
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Another major change was confirmed in R v Frascati (1981) 129 where the court held that-whatever may have been the position in the past-escape was an offence in itself. 130 It did not depend on the outcome of the trial in respect of which the escapee was in custody. In this case the escapee escaped from a police cell at the magistrate's court and was subsequently found not guilty of the charge on which he was placed in the cell.
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This case effected a major change in that-in the past -prison breach, rescue and permitting escape (ie. voluntary escape) were linked to the issue of whether the escapee was guilty of felony or not. 132 The decision in Frascati to recognise that there is no link and that escape, per se, is a crime-is indubitably a better, and more modern, approach.
For all these reasons, for the modern law on escape, prison, breach, rescue and permitting escape to refer back to old authorities and cases is unwise and, today, a modern re-statement of the law which is more coherent and clear is required.
123 Walker, n 39 (amercement) 'In English law a pecuniary penalty for an offence, where the ofender was brought before the court of his lord, whether king or subject superior, and was at the mercy of the lord, The amount seems originally to have been arbitrary but later came to be settled by custom…' See also Pollock & Maitland, n 29, vol 2, pp 513-5. 124 See for example, n 79 where Simon Seagrave (custodian of the Tower of London) was severely amerced by Edward II for letting Roger Mortimer escape from the Tower of London. 125 This could be draconian. For example, in 1395, a creditor brought a bill of complaint against William Shiryngham and Robert Elys, sheriffs, for an unpaid debt of c. £182 owed by a prisoner in Newgate prison. The creditor asserted the sheriffs were liable in allowing the prisoner to escape. In turn, the sheriffs argued they had appointed a deputy to guard the jail. Thus, he was responsible. Their defence was rejected and the sheriffs were committed to prison until they paid the debt. See AH Thomas, Calendar of Select Pleas and Memoranda of the City of London 1381-1412 (Cambridge UP, 1932), p 233. This partly explains why people often did not want to be sheriffs, constables etc. As a result, it is a common law crime to refuse to take up a public office. 126 See Hawkins, n 4, book 2, p 136 'where-ever a person is found guilty upon an indictment, or presentment, of a negligent escape of a criminal actually in his custody, he ought to be condemned in a certain sum to be paid to the king, which seems most properly to be called a fine; but this doth not appear clearly from the old books, for in some of them it seems to be taken as a fine, in others as an amercement, and in others it is spoken of generally, as an imposition of a certain sum, and without any mention either of fine or amercement.' 127 Bellamy, n 11, p 190 'The fine was really the result of a bargain for release struck between the king and the offender. The sentence was not 'pay a fine or suffer imprisonment' but 'go to prison and then if you can offer the king sufficient financial inducement you may obtain reléase.' See generally, ch 6. This was also pointed out by Pollock & Maitland, n 29, p 517 'What the judges can do is this:-they can pronounce a sentence of imprisonment and then allow the culprit to 'make fine', that is to make an end (finem facere) of the matter by paying or finding security for a certain sum of money. In theory the fine is a bilateral transaction, a bargain; it is not 'imposed', it is made.' 128 Today, the modern 'fine' is not the same as the older concept of 'fine' which was paid as an alternative to imprisonment. Today 130 The court referred to 'prison breach without the use of force' and to 'escape from lawful custody.' However, it mean't escape. See p 30. 131 The escapee was on remand in custody, awaiting trial on a charge of conspiracy to defraud and other allied offences. He escaped from a police cell through a sky-light window (it appears there was no force; therefore, it was escape -not prison breach). He was later re-captured. The court held the fact that he was not found guilty of the charge in respect of which he was imprisoned was not relevant. Kenneth Jones J 'today, since the death penalty and the distinction between felony and misdemeanour have both gone, it would seem that there is no authority whatsoever for holding that acquittal of the principal offence is an answer to the present day offence of breach of prison. But what is abundantly clear is that there never was authority, either in Hale or in Hawkins, for the proposition that such an acquittal was an answer to the charge of the misdemeanour or prison breach without the use of force. That misdemeanour has been replaced, as I have pointed out, by the offence today of escape from lawful custody.' 132 Thus, although the court did not say it directly, prison breach, permitting escape and rescue are also all now crimes in themselves-and not linked to any underlying offence in the person who flees from lawful custody. This is important because it means there is no need now to have distinct crimes of escape and prison breach. The issue of force should now go to the sentence, not to the crime.
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Modern Law of Escape
As to the modern law of escape, prison break and rescue, this is dealt with in short form in Archbold (2013 ed). In respect of escape, it provides that:
It is an indictable offence at common law, punishable by fine and imprisonment, for a prisoner to escape without the use of force from lawful custody on a criminal charge or by civil process.
133
As authority for this, Archbold refers to Hawkins 134 and Hale. 135 Archbold also notes the following:
(i) Nature of Legal Custody
As to the concept of legal custody, in R v Dhillion (2006), 136 the court held that the prosecution must prove that: (a) the defendant was in custody; (b) the defendant knew he was in custody (or, at least, was reckless as to whether he was or not); (c) the custody was lawful; and (d) the defendant intentionally escaped from lawful custody. As to this, a person in custody on a lawful charge includes a person in:
 lawful custody following arrest; 137 or  custody awaiting trial, sentence or serving a sentence; 138 or  transit to (or from or at) a prison, remand centre, court etc.
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Whether a person can be said to be in legal custody at any time was a question of fact. Regard may be also may be had to the Prison Act 1952 (legal custody of a prisoner):  Section 13(1) provides that every prisoner shall be deemed to be in the legal custody of the governor of the prison;  Section 13 (2) provides that a prisoner shall be deemed to be in legal custody while he is confined in (or is being taken to or from) any prison and while he is working, or is for any other reason, outside the prison in the custody or under the control of an officer of the prison and while he is being taken to any place to which he is required or authorised by or under this Act or certain other Acts 140 to be taken, or is kept in custody in pursuance of any such requirement or authorisation.
Archbold also notes that:
 'custody' is to be given its ordinary and natural meaning viz. a person's immediate freedom of movement being under the direct control of another. 141 A person on bail was not in lawful custody. Therefore, if he absconded, he did not commit the offence of escape. 142 A prisoner on temporary release from prison who failed to return to the same at the expiry of the release period, could not be said to have escaped from custody. Therefore, he could not be guilty of escape; 143  'escape' occurs where a person having a prisoner lawfully in his custody, voluntarily or negligently suffers him to go at large. A custodian is guilty of an offence if he 'voluntarily' or 'negligently' allows his prisoner to escape from lawful custody. 144 Archbold relies on old authorities that there is no escape if the prisoner is not lost sight of between the attempted escape and re-capture. 145 Archbold also notes that persons who aid a prisoner to escape are-at common law-guilty as principal, or may be indicted for rescue. 146 And that the Prison Act 1952, s 8 provides that every prison officer while acting as such shall have the powers, authority, protection and privileges of a constable. It is an offence to induce (or knowingly assist) a person liable to be detained in hospital or who is subject to guardianship under the Mental Health Act 1983 or who is a community patient, to absent himself. 151 It is also an offence to induce (or knowingly assist) a person in legal custody under the Mental Health Act 1983 to escape, or to harbour or assist a person unlawfully at large to remain at large. 152 In conclusion, legislation has intruded into the area of escape.
Archbold-Prison Breach
Archbold states that:
It is an indictable offence at common law, punishable by fine and imprisonment, to breach prison. Breach of prison consists in the escape from lawful custody by the use of any force. 153 It is immaterial whether the custody is criminal or civil and whether the prisoner is actually within a gaol or is only in the constable's house or lock-up, provided that he is lawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty. 154 While this statement is correct, it is not above criticism: (a) Archbold does not deal with the position on treason which can apply to prison breach as well as to escape and rescue; (b) Archbold cites Russell (writing in 1964) who merely cites Hawkins (1824 ed). 155 As a result, the formulation is archaic (also, people tend to refer to 'police stations' these days as opposed to a 'constable's house or lock-up'); (c) the fine and imprisonment imposed in times past tended to be different where the breach was of prison, a constable's or a private person's custody, these crimes being graduated, in terms of severity. This is not noted.
It is asserted this distinct crime of 'prison breach' should be abolished for the following reasons:
 As previously noted, the distinction between escape and prison breach-the latter requiring some degree of force-stretches back to 1295 and, indeed, before. The need for 'force' was linked to it being a felony in every case to escape from prison, using force, prior to 1295 and a felony thereafter, if the person was committed for felony;  However, with the death penalty no longer applying for any crime (since 1998) and with the categorisation of crimes into treason, felony and misdemeanour having gone (since 1967), there is no need to preserve this crime as such. 'Escape' should cover escape both with, or without, force (the distinction now not being material to the offence);  The degree of 'force' in times past could be minimal and such a distinction is of little merit today 156 Further, the punishment for escape and prison breach is now the same: fine and imprisonment. In Coughtrey (1997), 157 McCowen LJ noted that prison breach was a very serious offence for which a substantial sentence of imprisonment was to be expected due to the: (a) fear and apprehension it generated; (b) disruption to prison life; (c) violence and disorder it might lead to; (d) need to deter the culprit and others. However, these issues also apply to escape. Thus, any force used (if at all) in an escape should be reflected in the sentence-not in separate crimes.
In conclusion, it is asserted that the common law crime of 'prison breach' should be abolished and that a legislative crime of escape should cover situations both where force is-and is not-used (i.e. force being immaterial to the crime, but not to the sentence).
Archbold-Rescue
Archbold states that:
Rescue at common law is forcibly liberating a prisoner from lawful custody. 158 If the prisoner is in private custody, the rescuer is not criminally liable unless he knew that the person was in custody on a criminal charge… Fine and (or) imprisonment [if the person rescued has not been convicted of the offence for which he was in custody].
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It is asserted the wording of Archbold in brackets above should no longer be followed after R v Frascati (1981) . 160 That is, the punishment for rescue should not be linked to whether the person freed is subsequently guilty-or not guilty-of a crime. Instead, rescue (like escape and prison breach) should be a crime in itself.
Thus, this 'link' between the punishment and the underlying crime for which the prisoner was in for, should be broken. As previously noted, this link related to the death penalty and to the categorisation of crimes into treasons, felonies and misdemeanours. It is not appropriate after 1967 when that categorisation became redundant and especially so after 1998 when the death penalty for all offences was abolished.
Further, it is asserted-in any case-this common law crime of 'rescue' should be abolished. Instead, the crime should be a legislative one; that of 'assisting' a person to escape, being linked with the Prison Act 1952, s 39 (see 9(ii)). This should apply regardless of whether force is used or not (as with escape). After all, waiting with a car to drive away an escaped prisoner is just as culpable as forcibly opening a prison door, to enable a prisoner to escape.
In conclusion, it is asserted that the common law crime of 'rescue' should be abolished. A legislative crime of 'assisting an escape' should cover situations where force is-or is not-used (i.e. force being immaterial to the crime, but not to the sentence).
What of High Treason?
Archbold states (as to rescue re HT, without noting that it would also apply to escape and prison breach): 161 The offence is generally treason or misdemeanour according to the quality of the person rescued; but if the latter is not convicted of the offence for which he was in custody, the rescue is only a misdemeanour…If he has been convicted for high treason, the rescue is high treason: if for a misdemeanour, the rescue is for a misdemeanour.
162
Halsbury states:
a person who rescues a prisoner he knows to be guilty of treason is himself guilty of treason and liable to the punishment for that offence. A stranger who rescues a person committed for and guilty of high treason, knowing him to be so committed, is guilty of high treason, whether he knew that the party rescued was guilty of high treason or not, and he would, in like manner, be guilty of felony by rescuing a felon, although he knew not that the party was imprisoned by felony.
(underlining supplied)
First, it is asserted that these statements of Archbold and Halsbury are incorrect today. Second, it is asserted that Russell's statement-that a person is guilty of HT if he rescues from prison a person committed for HT even if the rescuer does not know this, is incorrect today. whilst so in custody he forcibly rescued him. As to evidence for the defence, it may be observed that any circumstance that will excuse a breach of prison will excuse a rescue.' Archbold cites Hawkins, n 4, book 2, 21 ss 1& 2 (necessity etc). 160 See n 129. 161 Archbold, n 17, paras 185-6. This suggests that Archbold referred to Halsbury, n 18, vol 11(2), pp 137-8 since Halsbury also fails to do this. 162 Ibid, para 28-185 cites Hale, n 4, vol 1, p 607 'As in the case of an escape, so in the case of a rescue…' See also Thus, prior to the 1423 Act (see 6), it is likely that a person who was committed for HT who escaped would have been executed as a felon. Further, prior to that Act, such a person committed felony anyway. By 1423, however, the Treason Act 1351 was in existence and, therefore, there was (obviously) regard as to whether escaping in the case of HT should bear a more severe punishment than felony. The 1423 Act made it so-and this then affected rescue and prison breach. However, both the 1295 and 1423 Acts have now been repealed, leaving the Treason Act 1351 to govern the issue.
In conclusion, I believe the error made by Archbold and Halsbury is to quote older authors without realising that they were referring to a situation when the 1295 and 1423 Acts were extant. 169 However, these Acts have now been repealed. Moreover, since 1967, it is not a felony (i.e. merits the death penalty) to escape or commit prison breach or rescue. Therefore, after 1967, it would be an anomaly if this was so in the case of treason-since all treasons are felonies. 170 Further, the 1351 Act abolished all common law treasons. Thus, any additional treason to escape etc. can only exist by virtue of statute and there is no Act currently providing for it.
(b) Russell is Incorrect
Russell (writing in 1964) stated that a stranger who rescues a person committed for-and guilty of HT-is guilty of HT whether he knew that the party rescued was guilty of HT or not. For this proposition Russell relied on Hale and on Bensted's Case (1640). 171 Hale (writing in the 1640's) stated:
To make a rescue felony the party rescued must be under custody for felony or suspicion of felony, and it is all one, whether he be in custody for that account by a private person, or by an officer or warrant of a justice, for where the arrest of a felon is lawful, the rescue of him is a felony. Whereas a person committed for high treason, who breaks prison and escapes, is guilty of felony only, unless he lets others also escape whom he knows to be committed for high treason, in which case he is guilty of high treason, not in respect of his own breaking of the prison, but of the rescous of the others: A stranger who rescues a person committed for and guilty of high treason, knowing him to be so committed, is in all cases guilty of high treason; and by some he is in like manner guilty, whether he knew that the prisoner were committed for high treason or not; but this opinion is not proved by the authority of the case on which it seems to be grounded. 178 
(c) Storm in a Teacup?
It should be pointed out that this issue is highly unlikely to occur in the future since the law of HT is obsolete in many aspects and it is very doubtful a case will arise in relation to it in the future. Indeed, it may be noted that three of the crimes which still comprise HT have never had a precedent. 180 Treason in respect of 'levying war' under the 1351 Act is also most unlikely to occur. 
Injustice of the Law
It is difficult not to argue that the law on escape, prison breach and rescue has created much injustice and that the life of a man (literally) often hung on a lot of specious legal analysis. Some examples might be given: All this was/is of little credit to the legal system.
Courts, Constables, Prison Officers, Private Persons
Much of the above analysis has considered the position, in particular, in respect of prisons. However, it also applies where a person seeks to escape etc., from the lawful custody of a constable, prison officer or private persons. Further, there still exists a distinct common crime relating to rescue from a court. I shall consider it first.
(a) Rescue from a Court
Coke (published in 1641) stated that:
If any man in Westminster hall, or in any other place, sitting the courts of chancery, the exchequer, the kings bench, the common bench, or before justices of assize, or justices of oier and terminer… shall draw a weapon upon any judge, or justice, though he strike not; this is a great misprision, for the which he shall lose his right hand, and forfeit his lands and goods, and his body to perpetual imprisonment: the reason hereof is, because it tendeth ad impedimentum legis terrae [to impede the law of the land]. So it is, if in Westminster hall or any other place, sitting the said courts there, or before justices of assise, or oier and terminer, and within the view of the same, a man doth strike a juror, or any other with weapon, hand, shoulder, elbow, or foot, he shall have the like punishment; but in that case, if he make an assault, and strike not, the offender shall not have the like punishment. 186 Hawkins placed this crime, and others, under a general crime of 'contempt of the sovereign' which crime-a previous article asserts-should be abolished. 188 182 Russell, n 4, vol 1, p 332 'the breaking need not be intentional.Thus where a prisoner made his escape from a house of correction, by tying two ladders together, and placing them against the wall of the yard, but in getting over threw down some bricks which were placed loose at the top (so as to give way upon being laid hold of) the judges were unanimously of opinion that this was a prison breach.  The punishment for such an offence was forfeiture of land and goods, life imprisonment and amputation of the right hand for drawing a weapon (amputation, even if it could still be imposed in O'Connor's case was remitted by the sovereign). 189 There is a further, but related, crime to this, where no weapon is drawn. Coke states:
If any do rescue a prisoner in or before any of the aforesaid courts committed by any of the aforesaid justices, it is a great misprision, for which he and the prisoner assenting to it, shall forfeit their lands and goods, and their bodies to perpetual imprisonment, but shall not lose the right hand, because no stroke or blow was given. 190 This crime still exists and I am sure it will be re-assuring to a prisoner to know that, at least, his right hand will be safe. 191 As to its modern formulation of this latter crime, Archbold (Blackstone's Criminal Procedure appears not to refer to it) states that it is a contempt of court (one in the face of the court):
To rescue or attempt by force to rescue a prisoner then being tried. 192 Archbold cites the Earl of Thanet's Case (1799) without having regard to the fact that, in this case, the charges relating to contempt of the sovereign (that is, contempt in the face of the court) were withdrawn because of problems in respect of the punishment-especially amputation. Thus, the precise position today is left uncertain.
It is asserted this crime should now be the same as rescue from prison. And that both should become one of 'assisting' a person to escape. This would remove this antiquated common law crime, with all its complexities, and give it a modern formulation. The more serious crime of drawing a weapon upon any judge should also be abolished.
(b) Constables, Prison Officers, Private Persons
In respect of these, Archbold notes the following:
 Escape-Negligence of Officer. Where the escape is negligently permitted by an officer, the punishment is said to be a fine only. 193 Archbold notes this appears to be erroneous and arise from a misconception of the nature of a fine in medieval times. 194 One would agree. 195 Further, this would seem to be inappropriate since the negligence of an officer is a greater dereliction than that of a private person and, thus, it should carry the same (or a greater) punishment-not a less. Archbold notes that it must be proved that the arrest and detention were lawful, that the defendant was a police constable and that he had the relevant person in custody under a lawful warrant. 196 The fact of the escape must also be proved. It is not necessary to prove negligence on the part of the constable, since the law implies it. 197 However, if the escape were not, in fact, negligent-if the escapee by force rescued 198 himself-or was rescued by others-and the constable made fresh pursuit after him, but without effect, all this must be proved by the defence. Also, it is immaterial whether the relevant person was guilty of the offence for which he was arrested, provided the warrant justifies his detention; 199  Escape-Private Person. Where a private person negligently permits an escape, the punishment is fine and/or imprisonment. 200 The offender must be restrained of his liberty for some criminal matter, otherwise the escape is not indictable at common law. Where the escape is due to the negligence of sheriffs or other officers, it may be dealt with under the Sheriffs Act 1887, s 29 or by attachment; 201  Escape-Voluntary-Officer. Archbold 202 notes-as to evidence-that the conviction of the escapee must be proved. Also, that, on his conviction, the escapee was remanded or committed to the custody of the officer. It must also be proved the escapee was in the custody of the officer pursuant to his sentence. The fact of escape must also be proved. An escape is voluntary where the keeper gives the prisoner his liberty with the object of saving him from trial and punishment. 203 Archbold asserts it seems unnecessary to prove the escape was voluntary; the law will presume this, until proved to the contrary.
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 Escape-Voluntary-Private Person. The punishment is the same as for an officer. 205 In relation to these matters today, one would question the following:
 Whether, today, an officer (whether a police constable or a prison officer) should be imprisoned and/or fined for a negligent escape. In the time of Hale, an escape was always presumed to be negligent in the officer. 206 However, that cannot be so presumed today. Further, in times past, civil liability and employment law had not evolved to the extent they have done today. In modern times, a negligent officer should not face-it is asserted-a criminal charge. Rather, it should be an employment issue (gross misconduct meriting dismissal etc.)-especially where the escapee is in for a civil matter and not a crime. This should be even more so where a private person is negligent since, unlike past centuries, private persons are rarely called on to assist prisons officers and it is inappropriate to punish with imprisonment or a fine. 207 In conclusion, one would assert that negligence in an officer or a private person, should no longer be a crime;  In modern times, should it be presumed that an escape was voluntary (see above)? Surely, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the constable/jailer? This also appears to conflict with the statement of Hale that negligence should be presumed;
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 As to a voluntary escape from a private person in the case of a criminal matter, one is dubious whether this should be a crime today. 209 Rather, if it was egregious, it would seem better it be one of refusing to assist a constable who calls for assistance in dealing with a breach of the peace, this being a common law offence. 210 In conclusion, one would assert that negligent escape should not be a crime. Nor 
Modernising the Law
In modern times, it is important the law be clear and intelligible-not least to prevent legal cases coming to court when they are not really necessary. As it is, the law on escape, prison beach and rescue is as clear as mud. This should not be so since the essential issue is not difficult: What should be the punishment for the escape of a person from lawful custody-or those assisting him? The reasons why the law became complex are not difficult to comprehend and have been adumbrated in this article. Today, it is asserted, the law can-and should-be greatly simplified. Thus:
 These offences should not be linked to the underlying crime (or asserted crime) for which a person is in prison or lawful custody-including in respect of any rescue or voluntary escape permitted by an officer;
211
 A person who escapes (whether using force or not), a rescuer and an officer who deliberately lets a person go (i.e. a voluntary escape) should bear the same punishment since they are equally culpable. So too, a person harbouring an escapee;  The imposition of fines in this area should be abolished. 212 So, too any additional punishment in the case of treason, although it is asserted this no longer exists (see 12);  The words 'prison breach' are a mis-nomer since it can occur in the case of a forcible escape other than from a prison. This offence and the other common law offences of escape and rescue should be abolished. Instead, there should be statutory crimes of 'escape' and 'assisting a person to escape.' Thus, the key to the modern crimes should be a simple distinction between: (a) a 'designated place'; and (b) a 'designated person'.  The former should include not only prisons but also equivalent reformatories, such as young offenders' institutions. Also, a court, since to escape from a court (or to be rescued from the same) is as much a serious affront to (and an attempt to undermine) justice as is the same in the case of a prison;  The latter should include when a person is in the lawful custody of a constable, prison officer or private person.
Thus, in conclusion, there should be two principal crimes: to escape and assisting escape.  Escape. It should be a crime to escape from:
o a designated place; 213 or o the lawful custody of a designated person.
214
This should apply regardless of whether force is used or not; since this should go to the sentence, not to the crime. 215 A 'designated person' should apply to a private person only in respect of a criminal matter. The crime of conspiring to escape from lawful custody also exists and it is asserted that conspiracy should apply to both the above crimes; 216  Assisting Escape. It should be a crime to assist a person to escape, or attempt to escape, from: o a designated place; 217 o the lawful custody of a designated person.
This should apply regardless of whether force is used or not. At present, it is not clear whether it is a crime to do this in respect of a designated person. The result is that the law of conspiracy is used, when it would seem better to make this a substantive offence. 218 At present, it is a distinct crime (Prison Act 1952, s 39, see 9(ii)) to 'facilitate' the escape of a prisoner, by intentionally: (i) bringing, throwing or otherwise conveying any thing into a prison; (ii) causing another person to bring, throw or otherwise convey any thing into a prison, or (iii) giving any thing to a prisoner or leaving any thing in any place (whether inside or outside a prison). 219 There is no need for this. This should now merge with the concept of 'assisting escape' and apply not just to a prison but to a 'designated place'. Thus, 'assisting' should include intentionally doing (i)-(iii);  Harbouring an Escapee. Presently, it is a crime to knowingly harbour a person who: (a) has escaped from a prison; or (b) who, having been sentenced in any part of the UK (or in any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man) to imprisonment or detention, is otherwise unlawfully at large. It is also a crime to give such a person any assistance with intent to prevent, hinder or interfere with his being taken into custody. See Criminal Justice Act 1961, s 22 (see 9(ii)). There is no need for this. This should also be merged into the concept of 'assisting escape' andit should apply to any 'designated place'.
Besides the above crimes of escape and assisting escape, there should be a further crime.viz  Failure to Return after Temporary Release. It should be a crime to fail to return to prison after temporary release. This will replicate the Prisoners (Return to Custody) Act 1995 (see 9(ii)). However, this should not apply only to prison but also to any reformatory.
As to the sentence, there should be imprisonment, but no fine. At present, the position in respect of the above crimes is inconsistent and confused. As to the maximum period of imprisonment, one would suggest that:  For the current offences of escape (with, or without, force), 220 assisting escape, 221 rescue, 222 voluntarily permitting an escape, 223 facilitating an escape 224 and harbouring an escapee 225 -in the case of a designated place-the maximum sentence for the new crime of escape or assisting escape should be the same. Perhaps, 10 years would be appropriate-save in cases under the Mental Health Act. 226 When the same is escape or assisting escape in the case of a designated person, perhaps, 5 years would be appropriate, in order to deter;  Failure to return after temporary release. It is asserted this should bear the current punishment (6 months) without the element of a fine.
227
Finally, as to:  An officer who negligently permits an escape-this should be a matter of employment law (dismissal, demotion etc.) rather than of criminal law;
228
 A private person who negligently permits an escape -this should not be a crime (whether fine or imprisonment). Nor if the same permits a voluntary escape.
